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ABSTRACT 
Dominik M. Baer: Front National Ascendant?: Explaining the Front National’s Enduring and 
Rising Popularity 
(Under the direction of Donald D. Searing) 
 
The Front National has seen enduring and rising popularity since the 2008 Financial 
Crisis. Unlike many other populist parties, the Front National has managed to weather both 
good and bad times. Scholars have identified any explanations for this sustained success. 
Some have offered systemic explanations, others have instead offered institutional 
explanations, and others still have argued for a political explanation. None of these offer a 
full and nuanced understanding of the rise in the Front National’s popularity.  
 The Front National remains popular in France not only for systemic, institutional and 
political reasons, but also for some uniquely French reasons. France’s unique history has left 
room for populist and sovereigntist politicians to claim political legitimacy and find a voice. 
France’s history and societal structure make it a perfect storm of sorts for the forging of an 
enduring, present and powerful populist lobby, which today takes the form of the Front 
National.
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 2: SETTING THE STAGE ..................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER 3: THEORIES ......................................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 4: SYSTEMIC EXPLANATION ........................................................................... 9 
THE FRENCH POLITICAL-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP ............................................................... 9 
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: FRENCH SKEPTICISM TOWARDS THEIR RULERS .......................... 12 
THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF FRENCH IDENTITY .......................................................... 15 
DE GAULLE’S LEGACY .......................................................................................................... 19 
RISE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT?............................................................................................ 23 
CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION............................................................... 34 
THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE FRENCH VOTER AND CHANGING PARTY ROLES ................... 34 
A CHANGING ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK .................................................. 39 
LIBERAL, THE SLUR ............................................................................................................... 41 
THE “OLD BOYS” CLUB OF FRENCH POLITICS ...................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................... 46 
NEO-GAULLISM: A DIVERGENCE ........................................................................................... 47 
RIGHT-WING FUSIONS: A DECLINE IN CHOICES .................................................................... 52 
A CHANGING FRONT NATIONAL ........................................................................................... 53 
CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION .................................................................. 60 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 64 
 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Nigel Farage, Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen or Viktor Orban. These names invoke 
strong feelings in many parts of Europe. Some celebrate their rise and others lament their 
continued relevance. Indeed, few topics have gripped European political discourse as the 
populist movement has. Whether you call them the Alt-Right, the New Right, the Populist-
Right or simply just Eurosceptics, this ideological group has come to be viewed as the 
defining threat to the European mainstream as well as to the integration project.1 Their 
unifying appeal to voters is opposition to the European Union and a call for the “return” of 
the nation-state. The actual validity of this is questionable, but nonetheless that is their brand, 
so to speak. These populists exist in every European country to some extent, yet few are as 
powerful as those in France. While others, such as Viktor Orban, have achieved power, the 
prominence of populists in a nation as central to the European project as France signal a 
strong current in French society, which leads away from the European Union and from 
continental cooperation. As the second largest member-state in the Union and arguably the 
lynchpin of the entire project, which is based in part on Franco-German cooperation, 
France’s political turmoil is of great interest for all those who study Europe.  
 
1 The terms Eurosceptic and Populist are not one and the same. Nor is the world populist synonymous with the 
movements of right-wing politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen. In fact, their placement on the 
political spectrum is a point of not-insignificant debate. Marine Le Pen at times has backed policies that are 
almost socialist in nature, something which their ideological “partners” in the German Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) would strongly oppose. This grouping of anti-establishment parties has a very diverse 
ideological standpoint when it comes to domestic politics. The one defining feature that unites these parties, 
however, is the desire for more control of national affairs. These parties oppose integration and see it as a 
subversion of national sovereignty, as such they are better described as Eurosceptics, because their unifying 
feature is first and foremost their dislike of the European Union’s current state. While this term also can be 
applied to left-wing parties such as the La France Insoumise party of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, in this article I will 
be using the term populist to refer to the right-wing Eurosceptics, an orientation I define by their rhetoric. LFI 
uses the rhetoric of the socialist-communist tradition and as such would fall outside my definition. This 
definition is also partially based on common parlance and should not be seen as a set-in-stone demarcation, but 
rather as a helpful shortening to increase the legibility of the final product.   
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Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National made it to the second round of the 
French presidential elections, an election where the traditional parties collapsed and the 
winner was from a newly founded party that, at the time, was led by the relatively unknown 
politician Emmanuel Macron.2  
 This result was quite shocking and potentially dangerous to the European Union (EU). 
France, together with Germany, had always been seen as the center of the European project. 
The Paris-Berlin Axis, the Franco-German alliance, whatever term its proponents and critics 
have christened it, has been central not only to the European Union but also to the 
Continent’s politics as a whole. Such a strong movement in the heart of the European Union 
is deeply troubling to proponents of the European Union and many are quick to denounce its 
rise. Yet where did this discontent come from. Where did the base support for the populist 
right come from? Why have large parts of one of Europe’s largest and more prestigious 
countries decided they are discontent with the status quo? I review the various explanations 
put forth by scholars as well as providing the historical context for the discourse, to see if 
there exists a potential explanation for the enduring popularity of the Front National.  
 In this article, I will demonstrate that none of the three schools of thought alone can 
explain the popularity of French populists. I will show that France presented a perfect storm 
for a populist takeover. France’s weak economic situation, elitist political structures and the 
political maneuvering of both the populists and the mainstream have all augmented the 
 
2 Rassemblement National is the new name that Marine Le Pen has given her party in June 2018. The literature 
still refers to the party as the Front National and the name carries a strong historical weight. In our examination 
we will also take a more backwards-facing view and as such our discussion will center around the times before 
the 2017 presidential election. As such, to both prevent confusion and to better trace the same political 
organization through the decades, this article will refer to the Rassemblement National by its historic name: 
Front National. This is not to reflect the political views of the author, but rather makes more sense within the 
historical approach adopted by this article. 
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preexisting political culture of France. France’s political history after World War Two is 
quite different from the rest of Europe. 
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CHAPTER 2: SETTING THE STAGE 
To underline just how drastic this change to French politics has been, let us look first 
at the political parties of France. While France has always had more than two parties and 
while party names and ideologies have varied wildly since the founding of the 5th Republic, 
the broad trend has remained that France has always been dominated by one of two “parties”: 
currently they are the center-left of the Parti Socialist (Socialist Party or PS) and the center-
right of Les Républicains (The Republicans or LS).3 Yet in the 2017 Presidential elections 
neither of these parties made it to the second round.4 What amplifies this destruction of the 
status quo is that neither the PS and the LS managed to outperform their populist 
counterparts. For example, the LS candidate François Fillon received 20.1% of the vote 
where Le Pen received 21.3%. The result on the left is even more striking, with Benoît 
Hamon of the PS receiving a paltry 6.2% compared to left-wing populist Mélenchon’s 
19.58%. Although the eventual winner was Emmanuel Macron, who scored 66% of the vote 
in the second round, he only received 24.01%, a number not much higher than that of the 
populists, in the first round.5   
 
3 Parties here referring to broad ideological groupings. As the exact names and compositions of the center-left 
and center-right have fluctuated fairly consistently. 
  
4 French elections are run in a two-round system. In the first round it is a general free-for-all, with any candidate 
being able to run. If no majority is found in the first round, a second round takes place wherein the two 
candidates with the highest scores engage in a run-off. 
 
5 These numbers are publicly available but also available at "1er tour présidentielle 2017 : sociologie de 
l'électorat" (PDF). Ipsos France. 23 April 2017. Retrieved 20.01.2020.  
Clarke, Seán and Josh Holder, “French Presidential Election: first round results in charts and maps”, The 
Guardian, 24 April 2017. Accessed 20 January 2020 https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-
interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest 
 5 
 The magnitude of this result cannot be overstated. While Macron, a pro-EU moderate 
ended up winning the election, the strength of populist parties and the weakness of the more 
mainstream (what we would call the establishment) parties is unprecedented in French 
politics. The 2017 Presidential election can and should be seen as a turning point in French 
history. While the Front National had been prominent for years, recent decades have seen a 
renewed and invigorated return to form for the National Front and for populists in France in 
general. But why? What is going on in French society to support and foster such a political 
change? There are multiple theories put forth by populism scholars. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES 
Some scholars offer a systemic explanation: they argue that the structure of the 
economy or the structure of French political culture have caused widespread disillusion with 
the established parties, a disillusion that populist candidates seize on. They argue that 
France’s social structures and political culture have led to a situation where many people are 
socialized in a way that predisposes them to eurosceptic thought. At first glance there is some 
merit to this, the French economy has a structure quite different from its British, American or 
German counterparts and this structure has led to certain problems such as a low employment 
rate and strong youth unemployment.  France also has a strong tradition of skepticism 
towards authority and a strong awareness of personal freedoms, which is demonstrated 
through the oft-cited stereotype of French striking culture.6 Yet for all the benefits of this 
theory, there are some who would point mainly to broad trends. Peter Mair, argues that rising 
disillusionment with how democracy is functioning coupled with changing political 
representation structures. 
Peter Mair once wrote about the “professionalization of politics” which he blamed for 
the hollowing Western democracies. Although Mair wrote his book Ruling the Void: the 
Hollowing of Western Democracies in 2011, before the upswing in populist support which 
followed the 2015 refugee crisis, his argument that mainstream parties were increasingly 
failing to motivate supporters and that voters were feeling ever more disenfranchised has 
only increased in relevance. Those who follow this institutional approach can be understood 
as blaming the structure of politics on the increasing disillusionment. In the French case one 
 
6 Goodman, Peter S., “Nordic-Style Designs Sit at Heart of French Labor Plan”, New York Times, 26 October 
2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/business/france-labor-reform-economy-macron.html 
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would point to the tradition of the grandes écoles, certain universities which have stocked the 
crème-de-la-crème of French politics for a long time. Graduates from these schools are first 
in line for ministerial posts and other top government jobs. Coupled with broader European 
trends for political parties to abandon the representative model (the idea that parties represent 
a select section of society) towards broader governance focused parties, Institutionalists like 
Mair would argue that the insular nature of French politics has led to the French people 
feeling less like the source of political power, but rather like the peasantry being ruled by an 
elite class, something which both the French Revolution and the strong Communist party 
since 1945 have shown that the French have little patience for. Others still, lay the blame at 
the feet of French politicians themselves.  
Proponents of this political aspect would argue that through their machinations and 
their reputation for a blasé attitude towards corruption and scandal, the French political elites 
have not only shot themselves in the foot, but have also stepped on the landmine they 
themselves placed. There is some merit to these allegations as French politicians are 
notoriously unpopular. French politicians have earned a reputation for being out-of-touch and 
ruthlessly elitist. This reputation is in many regards well earned. Not only have both 
mainstream parties been wracked with scandals that, in their particularity, made them seem 
out-of-touch with the common man, but even Macron himself, the newcomer, has given off 
the air of elitism. Examples such as Conservative candidate Fillon being accused of bribery 
by means of being gifted expensive suits, a move he characterized as perfectly normal, or  
Macron answering a young man’s calls  of “Manu” with a sharp retort that he is to be called 
“Monsieur le Président”.7  Then there was former socialist president Hollande’s mistress’ 
book which accused Hollande of secretly hating the poor, a scandalous allegation for a 
 




socialist president. What the truth of the matter is, is frankly irrelevant. Rather the public 
perception of them does and the perception these scandals combined give is not a positive 
one. In the court of public opinion, these events have enflamed French passions towards a 
seemingly elitist ruling class, a trend that goes back many years and has been visibly present 
in French politics ever since the 2000s.  
While these three approaches form the core of explanations for France’s current state, 
I argue that none is satisfactory on its own. Rather, I demonstrate that France provides a sort 
of perfect storm. The French system is facing massive challenges that an entrenched culture 
of class struggle and a seemingly aloof ruling elite are unable to solve together. Through a 
paralyzed political system and a decline in social cohesion France was a tinderbox waiting 
for a light. This does not mean however, that the actions of the French elite and of the 
populists should not be criticized as well. The actions of the French elite also played a role. 
Through their mismanagement of public opinion, the political elite has poured fuel on the fire 
and opened the path for a sleek and modern-image populism to take hold.  
 We will go through each of the three theories, contextualize the arguments and 
discuss their merits. After which we will discuss problems that each approach has. We will 
then attempt to draw conclusions from the flaws and merits of each approach to come to a 
conclusion approximating the truth. 
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEMIC EXPLANATION 
THE FRENCH POLITICAL-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
First let us set the stage. France as a concept is well and good, but what does the 
French state look like? The French Republic is the largest EU member-state when it comes to 
area and the second largest in regard to population. It is the 2nd largest economy in the EU, 
behind only Germany and is expected to overtake Germany in population by 2055.8 Yet these 
numbers belie the unique French economic history that set the stage for our modern French 
state. The economic and social structures of France that supporters of the systemic approach 
tout as the cause of French discontent cannot be understood without knowing the France they 
grew out of. As such, we must first examine the defining economic ideology of post-war 
France: Dirigisme. 
Charles de Gaulle played a massive role in post-war economic development in 
France. Before the Second World War, the French economy had been inefficient and 
protectionist. The First World War had utterly destroyed French finances and economic 
crises during the 1920s and 1930s would further weaken the French state and economy. In 
the interwar period there was no grand reconstruction. The war ended and the now destitute 
and broken French economy was left in the ruins it had ended the war in. As such, France 
was very harsh on Germany and demanded reparations to rebuild itself. Rather than bring the 
French economy back from ruin, the money extracted from Germany merely fueled the next 
 




war. France’s economy would not recover by the start of the Second World War, when, like 
most of Continental Europe, France too would be occupied by Germany.  
The Second World War, much like the First, would again destroy French finances. 
After the war, the French economy was in ruins, after large-scale bombing by the Allies and 
industrial exploitation by the Germans, what little economic activity had been possible during 
wartime had been devastated. Memories of French economic weakness and the experiences 
made attempting to compete with the modernized economies of Germany and the United 
States had left their mark on De Gaulle. De Gaulle would place an emphasis on a strong state 
and was firm in his belief in the duty of the state to maintain a strong economy and the fresh 
memory of the failure of market forces, led to the founding of a new economic school of 
thought. De Gaulle, in the words of Serge Berstein believed that  
“it is the imperative of the state, as guardian of the national interest, to give impetus to 
economic growth and to guide it. Liberal opinion is accepted if it promises more efficiency 
than planning. As for social justice, so long as its natural distrust of big business can be 
allayed, it is less a matter of doctrine than a means of upholding stability.”9 
This gave rise to the economic ideology known as Dirigisme. The name comes from 
the French word diriger, meaning to direct. This doctrine believed in a fundamentally 
capitalist society, with profit-driven enterprises and market-based goods allocation, yet it also 
believed that the state had a duty to steer economic policy. This was mainly done through a 
technique known as indicative planning. What this means is that the state would use grants, 
subsidies and taxes to influence private actors. Although France did nationalize certain 
sectors, most sectors were to remain largely or entirely private. The French government also 
followed a similar policy to the Japanese Zaibatsu policy in which certain large private 
 
9 Berstein, Serge "Gaullism". The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World second edition ed. Joel Krieger. 
Oxford: 2001. pg. 307-308 
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companies were to become major corporations and received disproportionate support from 
the state. This was a direct response to the economic fragmentation before the Second World 
War. The concept of a “national champion” dictated that French companies must become 
large to compete on a global scale. The liberal doctrine of the past had not managed to create 
the large industrial companies that France saw in other countries. There was no French 
General Motors, no Krupp, No Mitsubishi. This meant that economic production could not 
benefit from economies of scale. It had also meant that France’s ability to wage modern 
industrial war was handicapped compared to its European rivals. To solve this, the post-war 
French government promoted mergers and the foundation of “national champions”. These 
“national champions” are technically private companies that receive massive and 
disproportionate government support, but as a consequence of this, they are also expected to 
further the national interest in exchange for these benefits. This meant a larger degree of 
scrutiny and an implicit agreement to support the state, even if unprofitable. A good modern 
example is the European company Airbus, which receives support from European 
governments to compete on the global market, a fact that has caused no small amount of 
animosity, in particular with the United States over “unfair” aid to companies.10 France 
developed many of these national champions in sectors it deemed particularly promising or 
particularly important to French strategic interests.  
Using this economic policy, the French economy rebounded and expanded rapidly. In 
France these are remembered as the Trente Glorieuses or Glorious 30 (years), these 30 years 
from 1945 to 1975 saw unprecedented economic growth in France. Due to solid economic 
planning, Marshall plan aid and the forgiveness of France’s 2.8 billion dollars of debt to the 
 
10 There exist numerous other examples, including much of the Chinese and Russian economies, but also 
companies like Samsung in South Korea.  
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United States (much of it from World War One) via the Blum-Byrnes Agreement, the French 
state became wealthy and could develop the welfare state we know today.  
The French economy expanded rapidly, and the French standard of living exploded. 
The standard of living as calculated by household head income went (from a baseline of 100 
in 1939) from 125 to 320 in 1975.11 French society would also change, with a decline in the 
traditional proletariat and farmers and a mirrored rise of the middle class. Yet despite these 
changes, one French tradition has remained from the days of the Popular Front of the 1930s.  
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: FRENCH SKEPTICISM TOWARDS THEIR 
RULERS 
In many countries, particularly Anglo-Saxon countries, striking is seen as the last 
resort of a disillusioned and frustrated working class. While this would fit the narrative that 
the French are disillusioned with government, this is not entirely the case. The French have 
long held a distrust for government and have few qualms about using, what are to other 
countries, extreme measures to voice their discontent with even minor changes to the existing 
structures. One such example is the French strike.  
La Grève or the strike in English, has long been stereotyped as a French tradition. 
There are many jokes about Frenchmen being more willing than any to lay down their tools 
and demand justice. Yet there is a kernel of truth to these claims.12 “I cannot say if France is 
the most strike-prone country in the world” said Kurt Vandaele of the European Trade Union 
 
11 Gildea, Robert. France since 1945. Oxford University Press. Oxford: 2002. 93. 
 
12 It should be noted here that France is not the most strike prone country in the world nor is it the highest in 
Europe, but the right to strike is strongly protected in France and has been protected for a long time. Since as 
early as the 1800s the right of workers to strike was guaranteed. French strikes are on average quite short and as 
such the disruption is not too much. This means that the strikes in France are not particularly disruptive but are 
frequent. Others such as Spain have had far more strikes in the past, but since the financial crisis France has 
remained stable in the number of strikes, whereas Spanish strikes have collapsed in number. As seen under. 
European Trade Union Institute. “Strikes – Map of Europe”. Data from pre-
2017.https://www.etui.org/Services/Strikes-Map-of-Europe. As such it cannot be considered unreasonable to 
say that there exists a French strike culture, even if the jokes that the French are always on strike is untrue. 
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Institute, “but it is certainly a country … that is above the European average, and always near 
the top”.13 The International Labour Organization puts France in second after Argentina in 
the category “days not worked per 1000 workers due to strikes and lockouts”. 14This is 
because, according to historian Jean Garrigues, the French have a long history and tradition 
of resistance to authority. Garrigues argues that modern France was born on the back of the 
French revolution and that this distrust of authority has remained in the French population.  
Since the Revolution, France has had a tumultuous history, since the Revolution 
France has seen multiple monarchies, both by Bonapartes and Bourbons, five republics, one 
brief commune and one fascist government. If we only include the 20th century, France had 
three Republics and the Vichy fascist government. There are still Frenchmen who are not 
particularly old who still remember a different government, as such there is little aversion to 
criticizing the government structure and even calls for a rewritten constitution are not 
uncommon. Left wing parties today in France including the PS have called for a new 
constitution in their campaign manifestos.15 Even the winners of the current system have 
called for changes to the existing system. Macron and Le Pen have also called for cutting 
down on the number of representatives from the National Assembly and Senate.16 So there is 
both a historical and cultural willingness to change the system entirely, but to Jean-Pierre 
Durand, a professor of sociology at the Université d’Evry, this is not the only explanation. He 
argues that a culture of skepticism exists in France. The idea being that the French always 
 




14 Of the 24 countries they monitor. Ibid.  
 
15 Corlay, Antoine. “Election présidentielle: Ve ou Vie République?. LeMonde. 5 April 2017. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/05/election-presidentielle-ve-ou-vie-
republique_5106574_4854003.html. Both Mélenchon and Hamon openly called for a 6th Republic in a televised 
debate. 
 
16 Merritt, Giles. „Will Macron introduce France to the Sixth Republic?”. Euronews. 11 May 2017. 
https://www.euronews.com/2017/05/11/view-will-macron-introduce-france-to-the-sixth-republic 
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question both the intentions and implications of any changes. He extrapolates this to politics 
and argues that “as soon as any reforms are announced, a large number of French people start 
questioning … where the traps are”.17 Questioning authority, according to Durand, is one of 
the key pillars of French society. 
But where does this come from? Garrigues goes on to lay part of the blame in the 
structure of the Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic was founded on October 4th, 1958. It 
replaced the Fourth Republic, which collapsed over questions of decolonization and due to 
cabinet instability. The Fifth Republic was designed by De Gaulle with a strong presidency to 
direct policy, as the previous Fourth Republic and the Third Republic before it, had been torn 
apart by sectarian bickering and unstable cabinets. Presidents were also changed to be 
directly elected rather than through a parliamentary vote, as had been done in the Fourth 
Republic, Garrigues argues that this contributes to the myth of a single person being able to 
solve problems. He states that “it implies a somewhat irrational attachment to one man – a 
near religious belief in the ability of one man to change everything…and necessarily, such 
focus on one person, on the president of the republic, leads to disappointment. Cumulative 
disappointment leads to a … loss of trust, and a loss of trust leads to revolt”.18 The idea that if 
an election is framed as being all about one person rather than about a movement, then that 
one person will inevitably be viewed as a failure or worse corrupt. This plays directly into the 
disillusion supporters of the systemic approach argue the French have gained through their 
societal structure. But what of other social changes that occurred in France?  
  
 




THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF FRENCH IDENTITY 
 One of the first explanations many go to when asked why populism exists, is racism. 
This could in theory match up with the French systemic case, the Front National has an anti-
immigration rhetoric and has been openly in favor of more French nationalism. This 
explanation is, however, overly simplistic and does not adequately disentangle the complex 
French relationship with race and ethnicity.  
Although France had long been a nation of many cultural groups, the idea of the 
French as a nation had been the prevailing narrative throughout the 19th and early 20th 
century. This national identity, despite mutterings from Corsican, Breton or Alsatian 
separatists, largely taken hold by the latter 20th century.  
 After the defeat at the hands of the Germans during the Second World War, De Gaulle 
sought to lead his country back to the top. De Gaulle was above all, focused on his nation, his 
Patrie, his France. But what was France? Who were the French? This question had long been 
a point of discussion in France. Despite the claims of the French Revolution, there was no 
one French people. From the time of the French revolution, French has been the official 
language of France. However, up to and after the Revolution, most Frenchmen did not speak 
French. Rather the people of France spoke a large variety of languages: from the langues d'oïl 
(a dialect continuum linking French to its neighboring languages), to Occitan, to Catalan to 
German and Breton. The people of France were not as indivisible as Republic declared itself 
to be. It became a key move of the Revolution to create the French people. 
 Henri Grégoire, a French revolutionary, campaigned hard for the adoption of a 
universal language in France. He and many revolutionaries felt that languages merely led to 
obscurantism and hampered the ability of the people to work as a group. Unlike modern 
linguists, the languages of France were not classified as languages but rather as patois, crude 
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unrefined dialects of French.19 As such, assimilation of the rural communities into the French 
nation became a key part of the Revolution and later Napoleon’s campaigns. This trend did 
not die with the Revolution and even after Napoleon French was considered the only 
acceptable language in France. School became mandatory and only French was allowed, even 
in schoolyards. It was not until the 1950s that France accepted the right of minority languages 
to exist.20 To this day, minority languages remain a contentious issue in France.  
However, it was not only the innate internal divisions of metropolitan France that 
caused cultural strife in France. France would also build the second largest Empire in the 
world and as such, many foreign peoples were brought under the shield of the French 
Republic. Unlike British imperialism, assimilation was a core tenet of French imperial policy. 
French policy was to encourage the adoption of the French language and French culture in 
the colonies. The idea was that if you spoke French and acted French you would become 
French. This became more than fancy rhetoric, for there existed a group of four colonial 
towns in French Senegal known as the “quatre communes” or four Communes. In 1848 full 
legal rights were extended to all who resided there, and it received a seat in the French 
parliament.21 While the implementation of these rights is contested and inconsistent, the 
implication that all could become French if they adopted French culture was there. 
 Now this does not mean that France did not discriminate based on perceived race. 
France, for all its rhetoric of universality, has always maintained an undercurrential concept 
 
19 Bell, David A. “Tearing Down the Tower of Babel: Grégoire and French Multilingualism”. Springer 
Science+ Business Media Dordrecht 2000.  
20 Much of the preceding paragraph from Lodge, R. Anthony. French: from Dialect to Standard. Psychology 
Press 1993. 
 
21 Johnson, G. Wesley. The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four 
Communes, 1900-1920. Stanford University Press. Palo Alto: 1971. 
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of Frenchness. There was an understanding of what it meant to be French. A famous 
Frenchmen once said of immigrants in France that, 
“It is very good that there are yellow Frenchmen, black Frenchmen, brown 
Frenchmen. They prove that France is open to all races and that she has a universal mission. 
But [it is good] on condition that they remain a small minority. Otherwise, France would no 
longer be France. We are, after all, primarily a European people of the white race, Greek and 
Latin culture, and the Christian religion.”22 
This mysterious Frenchmen was none other than Charles de Gaulle himself. Before 
1945, immigrants did exist in France. The nation had seen immigration for centuries as an 
industrial hub as well as a famously hospitable country for exiles from abroad. Philosophers, 
Revolutionaries and every other breed of thinker often found a safe haven in France before 
the First World War. In 1946 foreigners accounted for 4.3% of the French population (1.7 
million). This number would increase to 6.5% by 1975 (3.4 million).23 While xenophobia had 
always existed in France, it would doubtlessly expand in the post-war years. From the proto-
fascist Boulangist movement to the Panama Scandals, France had a long history of 
xenophobia and in particular of anti-Semitism.24  
France’s troubled history of identity precedes 1945 and continued after. As the 
immigrant population of France swelled its character morphed as well. While in 1945 Italians 
and Poles had each made up 25% of the immigrant population, with Belgians and Spaniards 
 




23 Gildea 94. 
 
24 While the Panama Scandals are not universally considered an early display of anti-Semitism in French 
society, Hannah Arendt’s argument that the involvement of two men of Alsatian-Jewish origin helped spur the 
rise of anti-Semitism in France. For more information please consult Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. Schocken Books. 2004. Pg. 95-99. 
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following close behind, by 1975 the largest group became the Algerians at 20%, followed by 
the Portuguese at 18%. During this same timeframe, the French empire collapsed. Of the 3.5 
million immigrants to enter France between 1950 and 1972, two-fifths were repatriates from 
former French colonies, including over a million pied-noir, French-Algerians who fled an 
independent Algeria after the war there. This war would not only cause migration into 
France, but it would bring down the French government itself.  
Algeria was a different beast from France‘s other colonies. Parts of Algeria had been 
part of France for centuries and French-Algerians accounted for around 10% of the 
population.25 In the 1960s, a war began between the French and Algerian nationalists.26 This 
war would be characterized by brutality, terrorism and insurrection. This war in Algeria 
would directly lead to the fall of the Fourth Republic in France and would see the return of 
De Gaulle to politics. 
After his self-imposed exile from the late 1940s until the 1960s, De Gaulle would 
return to politics and would seek to de-entangle France from the conflict and, over the 
protests of the army and many pied-noir. The war in Algeria sharply divided public opinion 
and wanton violence was the norm for the last years of the conflict. Terrorism by both the 
pied-noir and Algerian forces and the deaths of many had led to widespread revulsion among 
the French. The complex relationship between metropolitan France, Algerians and the pied-
noir would not end with the Algerian war and relations would remain tense. The pied-noir 
experience in particular would be a tragic tale. Many felt as though they had lost their 
 
25 This number is based on the census of 1 June 1960, the last official French census of the region. In it, non-
Muslims accounted for 10% of the population with 1,050,000 members. While this number includes some 
130,000 Algerian Jews, they were calculated together for the census and as such I will use the combined number 
for Pied-noir estimates, as exact numbers were and are difficult to calculate. 
 
26 The name for the war is of a somewhat controversial nature, as France considered Algeria a part of France, 
not as a colonial holding. The name Algerian war of Independence is the widely accepted name for the war, but 
names such as the Algerian Colonial War are also preferred. As examining the exact nature of the conflict is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we will simply refer to it as the Algerian war to avoid any unnecessary 
confusion. This is also the name used many French sources. 
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country and had a hard time assimilating into mainstream French culture. Many felt that their 
mainland counterparts considered them an embarrassment, a violent and disgraceful chapter 
in French history they would have preferred to forget.27  
The Front National would only rise to prominence in the 1980s, despite large 
immigrant communities and strong questions of national identity having existed in France for 
decades at that point. The French have always had a large degree of variety in ethnicities and 
languages and the French colonial strategy was one quite different from that of the Anglo-
Saxon nations. This assimilated “French” rather than innate “Frenchness” created a unique 
understanding of self that has had impacts on the debates around immigration and citizenship. 
But before we go and claim that the Front National is spawned from xenophobia, we must 
analyze another key point of Le Pen’s agenda: namely her opposition to the European Union. 
This skepticism towards the European Union is perhaps older than many realize, going back 
to the days of De Gaulle himself. 
DE GAULLE’S LEGACY 
No politician since 1945 can be said to have had the same influence on France as 
Charles de Gaulle. His political ideology, known as Gaullism, has become the foundation for 
all political actors in France, even the National Front. Serge Berstein, in his book on 
Gaullism, states patently, that “it is no exaggeration to say that Gaullism has molded post-war 
France”. All French presidents have held true to Gaullist platforms, even those who do not 
consider themselves Gaullists. 28 
 
27 Smith, Andrea L. Colonial Memory And Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria And France. 
Indiana University Press. 2006.. pp. 4–37, 180. 
 
28 Berstein 307-308 
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It is thus of little doubt that Gaullism is profoundly French. However it is as difficult 
to quantify as it is French. Broadly speaking, Gaullism is based on the ideals of Charles de 
Gaulle and those who follow in his tradition can be labeled Gaullists. According to Berstein, 
Gaullism can be roughly divided into three eras. The first phase (1940-1945) was largely an 
anti-armistice movement. A Gaullist at that time was anyone who rejected the peace with 
Germany and demanded that France continue to fight on the Allied side. In the second phase 
(1946-1958), after De Gaulle was dethroned as leader of France, Gaullism was an ideology 
centered on criticizing the parliamentary systems of the Fourth Republic and advocating a 
strong presidency.  The third and final phase is when De Gaulle and Gaullism really came 
into its own. From 1958 to 1969, Gaullism was, in the words of Berstein, “...nothing other 
than the support given to the general's own politics after he returned to power in 1958 and 
served as president of the newly formed Fifth Republic from 1959 until his resignation in 
1969.”29 
But we still have not answered the basic question: What did De Gaulle stand for? 
Gaullism at its core is the idea of pragmatic power used to further the interests of the nation-
state. Drawing from his experiences growing up in the Third Republic, De Gaulle witnessed 
first-hand the factionalism and disunity that defined the last years of the Third Republic. As 
such, he wanted to create a unified France. A France that was the equal of its glorious history 
and would remain both a Great Power and independent. For De Gaulle this meant pursuing 
an independent foreign policy during the Cold War, creating a strong economy through state 
control and maintaining both energy and nuclear independence. Berstein writes that 
“[Gaullism] is neither free from contradictions nor of concessions to momentary necessity, 
even if the imperious word of the general gives to the practice of Gaullism the allure of a 
 
29 Berstein 307-308. 
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program that seems profound and fully realized.” 30 Despite this ephemeral nature, Gaullism 
had one unifying identity: a strong France. Absolutely central to De Gaulle’s vision was a 
strong and sovereign France. De Gaulle was strongly against the divisive nature of 
Communism and rejected anything that would divide the French people. He saw it as the goal 
of the state to increase the power of France and the power of its people.  
It was with this intention that De Gaulle supported the European integration. It was 
not out of a pan-European nationalism, but rather a cynical understanding that France was 
more powerful with Germany than without. De Gaulle was never a large fan of European 
integration, as has been exemplified by his insistence that the EU should not develop into a 
supranational entity. This led directly to the so-called “empty chair crisis”, when France 
boycotted the European Community until the Luxembourg compromise secured additional 
rights for member-states. Andrew Moravcsik argues in his paper “De Gaulle and Europe” 
that while most writings about De Gaulle look exclusively at his beliefs in regards to national 
prestige, the speeches memoirs and government documents of the era show that De Gaulle 
was focused primarily on achieving access to new protected markets for French industry.31 
All sources agree however, that de Gaulle was never interested in a supranational state, rather 
he sought to improve France’s place in the world through cooperation with Europe. While De 
Gaulle had opposed all of France’s actions regarding European integration before seizing 
power in 1958. After this, the pragmatic nature of Gaullism led to De Gaulle accepting and in 
fact supporting the European Union to strengthen French power. However, De Gaulle never 
ceased to oppose federalism. In his own words, De Gaulle was committed to a “Europe of 
 
30 Berstein 307-308. 
 
31 Moravcsik, Andrew. “De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory.  Harvard 
University. http://aei.pitt.edu/39396/1/PSGE_WP8_5.pdf 
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States”.32 His approach to the European Union was entirely intergovernmental, as seen by his 
attempts to create an alternative to the European Community in 1961 with the Fouchet Plan. 
This plan’s stated goal was to create an intergovernmental alternative to the increasingly 
supranational approach of the EC.33 
After De Gaulle’s death, Gaullists would go through rapid changes in the 1980s and 
1990s. Some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest the Gaullists “degaullised” their 
ideology.34 On the chopping block, in particular, were Gaullism’s ardent defense of national 
sovereignty and the dirigiste approach to the economy. Andrew Knapp, an expert on French 
governance wrote that Jacques Chirac and his RPR’s (de Gaulle’s old party) position on 
Europe had “changed practically out of recognition”.35 In 1984 Chirac agreed to a joint list 
with the UDF, a pro-European party, for the European elections of the same year. 
Furthermore, in 1986, the party agreed a Single-Internal Market, including the implied neo-
liberal economics such a project would entail. The party also accepted Qualified Majority 
Voting and a removal of the national veto from some areas, the antithesis of the original 
Gaullist vision for Europe and a direct counter to the concession De Gaulle himself had won 
during the Empty Chair Crisis. This transformation would continue and today, while 
rhetorical signs of the original Gaullist vision remain, little firm policy remains in place that 
reflects the anti-European views of the ideology’s founder. 
  
 
32 Harmsen, Robert and Menno Spiering. Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European 
Integration. Rodopi BV. Amsterdam 2004. Quoting Charles De Gaulle. 
 
33 Moravcsik, Andrew, The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht, 
Cornell University Press, 1998. 
 
34 Hanley 2001, Hainsworth, O’Brien and Mitchell 2005 in Harmsen and Spiering. 
 
35 Knapp, Andrew. Gaullism since De Gaulle. Routledge 1994.  
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RISE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT? 
So, what does this all mean, and to what extent does it matter? Now that we have set 
the stage, let us analyze how these changes have played out and to what extent they have 
supported the rise of the National Front. One of the first criteria that observers point to when 
you see a rise in nationalism is economic grievances. The RN has gone through numerous 
transformations since its rise to prominence in the 1970s and 80s, the party has oscillated 
between economically liberal and economically protectionist policies. James Shields has 
attributed these shifts partially to broader international changes, as the shift towards a 
protectionist and skeptical view towards capitalism occurred during the end of the Cold War, 
lending possible credence to this argument. The party has, however, kept with its 
protectionist policies since Marine Le Pen took over from her father.  
In the past Marine Le Pen has been very critical of capitalism in the past and has 
advocated for larger government control of sectors such as banking or energy. This rhetoric 
fits very well within the French right-wing tradition of De Gaulle and Dirigisme, yet the 
modern French right-wing is usually quite split on this issue, as Dirigisme has been 
somewhat phased out in France.  
In the 1980s, the 30 glorious years had come to an end and the French economy was 
struggling, just as many of France’s European neighbors were. Mitterrand, then President of 
France attempted to increase dirigisme by nationalizing certain companies, this was however 
sharply criticized and did little to improve the lives of Frenchmen. Mitterrand then made a 
historic U-turn, changing from a dirigiste approach to austerity in his famous “tournant de la 
rigueur”. This change was profound to French politics and cannot be understated in 
importance.   
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Mitterrand did this because he had only two choices: abandon Europe or abandon 
dirigisme. Rand Smith discusses this in his book “The Left’s Dirty Job: the politics of 
industrial restructuring in France and Spain”. He argues that the French Socialist government 
had only two choices: de-integrate from Europe or abandon the dirigiste approach to 
economic policy. Mitterrand chose to remain close to Europe and close to Germany and 
necessarily abandoned France’s dirigiste economic history. Ever since, France has adopted a 
more orthodox approach to economics. Although it retains some dirigiste tendencies, French 
government spending and regulation remain high and the government continues to hold 
shares in companies across many fields36,  these tendencies are a heavy reduction from the 
heyday of dirigisme and it would be a mistake to characterize modern France as dirigiste 
state..  
What this means for Le Pen is that the economic consensus in the mainstream became 
a more orthodox view towards economics. This radical change since 1983, while more in line 
with European expectations, has been a break from post-war French orthodoxy. Le Pen, 
despite being a nominally right-wing candidate has seized on this, leading many to consider 
her “left-wing economically”. Within the French context, this is simply false, as she is not 
unique in being a right-wing party in favour of more state control, dirigisme was a 
universally French policy, not a left-wing policy. Le Pen has argued for a nationalist and 
dirigiste economic policy. Le Pen has been notable in her critique of the European economic 
policy. Le Pen has repeatedly railed against the economic canon of the European Union, 
stating that  
 
36 Scholar Jonah Levy argues that the French model since 1983 has been what he calls a “state anesthesia 
system”, characterized by high spending to lessen the pain of economic restructuring. But as this is not an 
economics paper, we will not further dive into the specifics on French economic development”. For more 
information please consult: Levy, Jonah D. From the Dirigiste State to the Social Anaesthesia State:French 
Economic Policy in the LongueDurée , Modern & Contemporary France. 2008. 16:4, 417-435, 
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“The common currency [the Euro] has become the symbol of a federalist European 
policy and of the most absurd brinkmanship of financial elites who are ready to sacrifice the 
people on the altar of their interests. [...] France should veto useless and ruinous bailout plans 
for the countries that are victims of the euro. The money of the French people should stay in 
France.”37 
This line about economic elites being willing to sacrifice the well-being of workers in 
exchange for economic efficiency is particularly resonant in a France where staying the 
course with Europe has seen successive governments, both left and right make changes to 
increase French competitiveness with little success. France’s GDP has remained almost 
unchanged since 2011, despite attempts to jumpstart the economy. This is obviously not 
good, but it is further compounded by France’s large unemployment rate. The French system, 
with its dirigiste tendencies has always maintained a high unemployment rate. Since the 
Mitterrand reforms, the French unemployment rate has not dropped below 7.38%.38 The 
reason for this is highly contested in French politics and regardless of the economics behind 
it, France has long had a high unemployment rate and while typically this has been offset 
somewhat by strong protections once one is employed, this system has struggled during 
economic crises or economic stagnation.  
Another figure that helps contextualize French anger at their economic structure is 
France’s GINI coefficient. A GINI coefficient is a measure of the inequality in a country on a 
scale of 0 to 100. A score of one meaning that everything is owned by one person and 0 
meaning that everyone is exactly equal. France has scored a 28.5 compared with Germany’s 
31.1. Now this does not seem bad at first glance, but during the 2010s the French GINI 
 
37 EEAG (2017), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Populism – 
It’s Not So Simple,” CESifo, Munich 2017, pp. 50–66 https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/eeag-2017-economic-policy-
and-the-rise-of-populism.pdf 
 
38 Index Mundi. “France Unemployment Rate”. https://www.indexmundi.com/france/unemployment_rate.html 
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coefficient was hovering between a high of 31.1 and a pre-2008 score of 26.6.39 Germany has 
had a more stable 29-30 score line. In the broad scheme of things, France has a below 
average rate, yet for a nation that is both very aware of, and skeptical of, social inequality this 
number is quite high. Especially given that before the financial crisis France was among the 
lower end. Now, this is perhaps not a proper justification for French workers to feel 
threatened, but combine this with the ever more deregulatory attitude of both left and right 
wing mainstream parties, including current President Macron’s policies, you end up in a 
situation where French workers feel as though their government is attacking their well-earned 
rights.  
The political orthodoxy since 2008 has been reform and change, no matter the 
political affiliation. Socialist president François Hollande went after France’s Labour 
protections and received two months of strikes as a reward, Macron attempted to change the 
pension system and received his own protests.40 It is clear that to many French workers, 
successive governments have threatened their hard-earned rights, popular support for the 
strikes remains high and as such it is not unreasonable to extrapolate that not only the strikers 
are unhappy with their authorities. Here we clearly see a parallel between Le Pen’s words and 
the anger of the French people. Politicians of the mainstream of all creeds and persuasions 
have attempted to chip at the French protections and to many Frenchmen this is clearly 
unacceptable, as shown by the massive strikes these reforms have resulted in. Le Pen’s 
rhetoric of the unified elite against the people gains perceived legitimacy through the political 
actions of the political elites. While we will explore this political section in more depth at a 
 
39 Eurostat. „Gini Coefficient of equivalized disposable income – EU-SILC Survey”. European Union. 
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later point, it is impossible to ignore that this divide between economic tradition and 
economic orthodoxy plays a role in the systemic factors of Le Pen’s rise. 
This furthers the case that that De Gaulle’s thoughts and teachings led to the Front 
National’s popularity. While the early Front National considered itself an anti-Gaullist party 
(although at this point De Gaulle was dead as of 1970, so it was more oriented towards 
Pompidou, De Gaulle’s successor), the rhetoric of the modern, post-Cold War Front National 
mirrors that of De Gaulle in many ways. In particularly in their economic views and their 
views towards Europe. De Gaulle’s dirigisme would lead France up until the 1980s when 
Mitterrand saw the dismantling and marginalization of the state’s role in directly economic 
development. Today there are few calls for a return to dirigisme in either the PS or the center-
right parties. The modern right-wing party of Chirac, Sarkozy and Fillon, while claiming to 
be Gaullist in belief, has deviated somewhat from the original beliefs of De Gaulle himself.  
De Gaulle was primarily concerned with improving France through the European 
Union and some would question how he would view modern France’s role in the EU. 
France’s economy has been long weak, and Germany is now viewed as the primary economic 
engine of Europe. French proposals for reform, be they from Sarkozy, Hollande or Macron 
are often hand-waved by Berlin and little more than lip service is paid to French views on 
Europe’s future. While this does not necessarily mean that France is getting an unfair deal in 
the European Union, French public perception again matters more than reality. Since 1983 
France has followed the European consensus on economics and it has done little to improve 
the French economy. A succession of French presidents have failed to fix the economic 
problems that plague the country. This has caused the balance of power between Germany 
and France to change dramatically as the French economy faltered. Thus, leading to the 
argument by Le Pen that France is not being served by the European Union, as France’s 
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power and position in Europe has undoubtedly weakened since the 1980s. This Gaullist 
reading of French engagement with Europe has led to the Souverainist movement 
The Souverainist movement in France and the discontent with France’s role in the 
European Union has led to a modern discourse in France and abroad about France’s 
continued relevance. Even in some German newspapers such as the Handelsblatt which argue 
that Germany must keep France feeling valued despite the economic weakness of the French 
economy.41  
Another potential source of FN support may be the demographic changes in France as 
France has felt the demographic pressures for many decades and Le Pen openly argues 
against the changes to French culture that she argues migration has caused. Le Pen’s two 
biggest arguments have always been that she will fight against Economic globalization and 
Islamic fundamentalism.42 Economic globalism is another word for the neo-liberal economic 
order that both the European Union and the current political orthodoxy represent, she has in 
the past argued for more state control that harkens back to the dirigiste past of France. 
Islamic fundamentalism is another claim that can be based in history. France has always had 
a tense relationship with models of societal governance that were not based on the Laïcité 
model. This model contrasts with secularism in that religion becomes a mandated private 
affair. Religious dress is discouraged and open affiliations with religion in government affairs 
and in public settings is often banned or at the very least stigmatized.  
Nevertheless, there exists a long history in France of unease around other religions. 
We can see from the Dreyfus affair that despite France’s officially secular stance, religious 
 




42 Stothard, Michael. “Marine Le Pen promises crackdown on immigration and globalization”. Financial Times. 
5 February 2017.https://www.ft.com/content/9854f5e4-ebc3-11e6-930f-061b01e23655 
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minorities have been in the past distrusted. Islam has a terrorism problem at the moment, but 
this may only be playing on the pre-existing French notion that they are different. Whether or 
not the French are right in this belief is irrelevant, rather the fact that there it exists is 
indisputable. In 1991 41% of Frenchmen surveyed said that they were “rather” or a “little” 
racist.43 The same study also found that 8 out of 10 Frenchmen felt that North Africans had 
difficulty assimilating to French culture. Leaving aside the politics of integration and 
assimilation and whether this is true or not, the fact that this sentiment exists matters. It lends 
credence to the idea that Le Pen is speaking from a place of public support. Which would 
lend credence to the idea that institutional factors alone are responsible for the rise of French 
populism. This harkens back to France’s assimilationist policies and the understanding that 
while the French were not a nation initially, they have chosen to become one. As such, those 
who would break from this French tradition are not just foreigners, but threats to the nation-
building process.  
Yet this does not adequately explain why the Front National is popular, as the Front 
National was much more bigoted under the reign of Marine Le Pen’s father and she has 
undertaken huge efforts to sanitize the party’s image. Combined with this, even the 
mainstream right has seized on the assimilation debate. In the 2000s, French president 
Sarkozy called for a national debate on identity and immigration. He organized town halls 
across France to discuss who the French were. This was a tactical play on Sarkozy’s part to 
steal votes from the Front National, but he lost the election immediately after this, thus 
Sarkozy’s attempts to bring citizenship and identity to the forefront failed. This means that 
even if racism or nationalism played a role in the rise of the Front National, it was not 
sufficient on its own to bring about the massive changes to French politics. While the 
changing understanding of integration vs. assimilation has absolutely played a role, given 
 
43 Gildea 175. 
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Sarkozy’s failure to win back support by appealing to this topic, it is insufficient. It can only 
be seen as a contributing factor and would be insufficient on its own to explain the National 
Front’s popularity. 
The economic view holds a lot of water, given that, objectively, France has not 
thrived in recent years. Perhaps because her politicians were unable to transition the economy 
into a sustainable model or because of other reasons, regardless of the explanations the 
French economy has struggled to find a competitive advantage.  
The homogenization of orthodox economics in France has created another base of 
support to Le Pen, for in her own words, “there is no left and right wing anymore, there are 
only those who support globalization and patriots”.44 This statement cannot be read in any 
way other than as a declaration of war on the economic orthodoxy. Globalism and the 
prevailing economic order are the public enemy number one for Le Pen and the FN and here 
she clearly parallels the older protectionist model of economic development that was 
dominant in France before 1983. Until the reforms of the 80s attempted to make the French 
economy internationally competitive, France had always relied on its economic protectionism 
to keep the French citizenry employed. 
The rise in Front National vote percentage has indeed occurred around the same time 
as economic stagnation and the austerity reforms.45 While the two are not directly linked, 
there is a definite link that since the 1980s there has been a strong increase in support for Le 
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the party achieved 11% of the vote.46 This does not necessarily show a causational 
relationship, but such a trend strongly suggests that there is a correlation between the two. 
Another fact that leads credence to the notion that economic woes play a role in the rise of 
the Front National is the massive rise in support for the National Front since the 2008 
financial crisis. In an Ipsos study conducted after the 2017 Presidential election, where Le 
Pen received 21,9% of the vote in the first round, 25% of those who believed that today’s 
youth had it harder and 43% of those who found it “very hard” to live on their wages voted 
for Le Pen. This is clearly above the average she could expect given her vote percentage. As 
such the economic argument is further strengthened as those who struggle economically are 
statistically much more likely to support the Front National.  
This event, however, coincides with various changes both in France’s politics but also 
in the Front National itself, as such the correlation is to be taken with a grain of salt. The 
economic and cultural factor does not however, adequately explain the rise of populism, as 
economic stagnation has occurred under other governments, both in France and abroad, and 
has not led to a complete upheaval of the political order. Conversely, we should then see 
support for populism wane as economic conditions improve, but this has not occurred in 
France. Since 2017 we have seen a slight rise in support for Le Pen, edging out even her rival 
Macron since mid-2019.47 The cultural argument would also not fully explain the rise of the 
Front National, as the major culture clashes in France occurred in 1968, particularly around 
the student movement. The 1968 date is also of particular importance because it comes 
within the Trente Glorieuses. What this means is that at this time, French society had already 
been undergoing the changes to societal structure that we discussed earlier: namely the 
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decline in the traditional proletariat and the rise of the new working class and middle class. 
This means that the time of great cultural upheaval had already passed or developed over the 
past few decades. This patently rules out social changes in the worker sector as the culprit for 
the sudden increase in Front National support. What is true however, is that the Front 
National voter is generally lower-class. In lower-class votes, Le Pen beats even Mélenchon 
who scored 22+24% of their votes, compared to Le Pen’s 32+37%.48 
Another argument that is heard is that the older generations are unhappy with the 
course of society and that they support populists. This argument often comes from observers 
of Brexit politics, where there is a clear age disparity. This argument does not hold up 
however, in the French example. According to the IPSOS sociological report on the 2017 
Presidential election, the Front National scored the highest percentage of votes among those 
aged 35-49 and came only second behind left-wing populist Mélenchon in the 18-24 age 
category. In fact, at every age group below 60, excluding those aged 25-34, Le Pen 
outperformed even Macron.49 Societal change is often used as the argument for why Brexit 
occurred, yet this argument does not in any way shape or form work for the French example. 
If those who remembered the old dirigiste days were voting out of nostalgia we would see Le 
Pen win in these sections of society. Given that in 2017, the economic reforms had happened 
34 years ago, anyone under the age of 50 would be very unlikely to remember a different 
economic model. As such, it would need be a deeper cultural or societal impact of dirigiste 
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policy, since few of those who now vote for the Front National ever lived under a dirigiste 
France. Yet here we see Le Pen being a favored candidate. 
What does this mean in a broader sense? The economic circumstances and cultural 
traditions of the French may have buoyed the chances of populists, but they alone seem to not 
be solid enough, on their own, to diagnose the current situation. None of the factors 
individually makes a convincing case on its own. Thus, we must look not only at France’s 
cultural and economic history, but also at her institutions and politics. How France is 
governed and what processes these institutions use will serve as an additional source of 
potential explanations for the Front National’s rise. 
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CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION 
 Societies do not exist in a vacuum, there are inherent political structures in them that 
are both influenced by and have an influence on culture: namely politics. The institutions of 
the French republics have played a key role in developing a stronger populist presence in 
French politics. 
THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE FRENCH VOTER AND CHANGING PARTY 
ROLES 
Peter Mair was a scholar of political science who was growing concerned with what 
he viewed as growing disillusionment with Western democracy in Europe. He set out to write 
a book on the topic in 2007, years before we would see a notable upswing in populism 
Europe-wide. Tragically, Mair would not live to see his concerns become a part of public 
discourse nor would he see his book published, for he died suddenly in 2011. Nonetheless, 
his book was published in 2013 and contains a truly clairvoyant prediction of a declining 
faith in the political system. Mair first explains the data leading him to the belief that 
Europeans are growing more and more discontent with how they are governed, then he sets 
out two main theses for why this is occurring: the “retreat” of the ruling class and the de-
democratization of decision-making processes.  
 Mair weaves an eloquent story. By 2009, voter turnout had been steadily declining, 
and voters had become much more volatile, meaning that they changed the party they voted 
for more often. Strong party voters and party members saw decline in both numbers and 
energy. Long term, Mair attributes this partially to the loss of coherent voter-party relations. 
What this means is that the working class, which traditionally voted for the social democratic 
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parties, has, if not entirely, somewhat loosened the bond between party and voter. This is 
evident in the work of Oddbjorn Knutsen, who in his 2006 and 2007 works showed that, for 
parties where class affiliation was a strong indicator of voting intent, there was a strong 
decline in this correlation.50  
 In France, this trend is noticeable in the PS. Officially the number of members of the 
Socialist party sat at 120,000 in 2016, although active membership was down to about 42,300 
members. This is in stark contrast to the membership in 2014, when the party possessed 
160,128 members and from 2007 when it possessed 256,750 members.51 Long gone are the 
days when PS leaders could realistically dream of 500,000 members. This decline is mirrored 
across the political spectrum to the center-right which went from 370,250 members in 2007 
to 171,000 in 2011, although they recovered slightly to 179,000 by 2014. In the same 
timeframe, the Front National went from 7,000 members in 2007 to 42,000 in 2014.52 What 
this data shows is that while the Front National has a fraction of the party members of the 
mainstream parties, it does not suffer the same deflation that afflicts other French parties.  
 Earlier we showed that the economically vulnerable largely voted for the Front 
National in the 2017 Presidential election and this trend, combined with the work of Knutsen 
shows a clear image. The voter as a whole has become more cynical and disillusioned, but 
this trend is particularly apparent in parties that relied on a class basis, which has largely 
meant the parties of the left. The Front National has not entirely eaten this demographic, but 
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it contains the largest vote share. So why, according to Mair’s institutional argument, has this 
occurred. 
 Mair lays the blame at the feet of the political parties. In his telling of 20th Century 
European history, Mair describes the 20th century as the century of “Mass” or public 
participation. Democratic rights were extended to the entirely of the citizen body and 
technology such as radio and television allowed for greater public participation in all realms, 
including the political realm.  
 In response to this, European states developed a complex organizational web that 
extended far beyond politics. Through a process, well known to students of Dutch history, 
known as pillarization, the bond between parties and voters was strengthened. In these early 
years of mass politics, parties could not have been said to be vying for voters in the sense we 
think of today, but rather that they attempted to create social groupings of coherent identity. 
In the words of Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir “to speak of the majority of voters at a 
given election as “choosing” a party is nearly as misleading as speaking of a worshipper on a 
Sunday “choosing” to go to an Anglican, rather than a Presbyterian or a Baptist church.” 53 In 
the traditional example we had the standard voter who, if he worked in a steel factory, voted 
for the Social Democrats and belonged to the Union. If you were the son of a Social 
Democratic voter, you too voted for them. In this classical example parties competed on 
identity rather than on ideology. In the French example, either you were primarily religious, 
or you were primarily a worker. This would define which organization you joined and which 
you felt inclined to participate in.  
 This picture of the voter stems from a very mid-20th century understanding of politics 
and our political structures have evolved away from the pillarized, institutionalized parties of 
 
53 Mair 78, quoting Rose and Mossawir 1967, 186. 
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the past. Today parties such as this still exist in Europe, but they are no longer the main 
concerns of citizens or of institutions. Broadly speaking, the political parties of mass appeal, 
in German, the Volksparteien, or People’s parties, have moved away from the representative 
role and towards a party for all people. From Mair’s perspective, the goal of larger political 
parties was no longer to represent their sections of society, but rather to govern effectively.  
 This change in political organization is by now quite familiar to western voters, yet to 
those such as Mair and Knutsen who have put scholarship into tracking this development, 
this is untested territory. Rather than seeking to represent a section of society, the 
Volksparteien of today are only loosely based on a social cleavage and have a stronger 
foundation in ideology. Rather than the Social Democrats representing workers, for example, 
their policy has become broadly interventionist and focused on increasing the welfare of 
citizens through direct government structures.  
This is not, however, a large logical leap, for the policies the Social Democrats 
supported in the past on class grounds are still justified in this center-left tradition that 
cements their political orientation. Nonetheless, the representative role of parties has 
dwindled with the advent of lobby groups and citizens’ movements. Parties have become 
instead, the “receivers of signals”, to use Mair’s turn of phrase. Parties have become the 
agents who act upon the desires of citizens rather than the vehicles through which citizens 
express their desires. This has also been shown through the rise of movements such as the 
Fridays for Future movement or the Gilets Jaunes movement. Attempts to convert these 
movements into direct party support have been checkered. Although the former has shown 
limited success in turning protesters into votes for Green parties (especially in Germany), 
largely the effect has been to be awarded concessions by the political parties in power. This 
falls outside the standard view we had of parties. Large parties have been shown to negotiate 
with the people, not as their representatives, but as figures of authority that represent another 
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interest entirely. Emblematic of this detachment of the ideological-representative role and the 
governing role is the Third Way movement. While this movement has entered relative 
decline, this trend in center-left politics rose through the distrust of interventionist economic 
policies that arose through their overuse during the 1970s.54 This would be further 
exacerbated by the rise of the New Right in countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, personified by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher respectively. While 
this may have greatly benefited the economies of these countries, it heavily diffused the 
traditional class distinction that center-left parties had always demonstrated a commitment to: 
In fact, the founding document of this movement, the famous Europe: the Third Way 
by Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, both of whom would lead their respective countries, 
gives away its approach in its German title: Die Neue Mitte. The New Center, as it can be 
translated to from German, is a symbol of the transition away from the traditional left-right 
divide and a movement towards a centrist ideology. In the French case we return once again 
to François Mitterrand and his 1983 political U-turn. His abandonment of dirigiste policies 
marked the end of these policies in France.55 The next left-wing President François Hollande, 
would engage in austerity with the goal of bringing down the French deficit. As such we can 
say that of those who have become Presidents in the French system, none since Mitterrand 
 
54 Lewis, Jane and Surender, Rebecca. Welfare State Change: Towards a Third Way?. Oxford University Press. 
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55 Jacques Chirac was French president directly after Mitterrand and while he was very in-line with the orthodox 
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Chaney, Eric. “Jacques Chirac and the Economy: A Troubled Relationship and Mixed Results.” Institut 
Montaigne. 30 September 2019. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/jacques-chirac-and-economy-
troubled-relationship-and-mixed-results 
 39 
have challenged the orthodoxy of the Third Way wing of left-wing politics. In fact, this 
would not even be possible within the current European framework. 
A CHANGING ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
European competition laws generally have prevented direct state aid to companies 
since the earliest of treaties. The treaty of Rome directly states that “Save as otherwise 
provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”56  
While this paragraph was not immediately used to smite French dirigiste policies, 
when the European Union started enforcing these chapters in the 1980s, the French system 
was facing dismantling from both inside and outside. Mitterrand was accepting the liberal 
orthodoxy and the EU was starting to knock on the doors.  
This conflict between liberalism and the French economic doctrine didn’t end in the 
1980s either. In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy publicly opposed the insertion of the words “free 
competition” into the Union’s goals and was successful. This success was however, largely 
symbolic as Joseph Stiglitz argues in his new book Rewriting the Rules of the European 
Economy. In it, Stiglitz argues that the European Union has become overly market focused 
and that the current EU is the result of a decades-long battle in Europe between a market-
oriented economy and one focused more on protectionism.57 This, he argues, drives 
 
56 European Union. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - PART 
THREE: UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS - TITLE VII: COMMON RULES ON 
COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - 
Section 2: Aids granted by States - Article 107 (ex Article 87 TEC) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12008E107 
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inequality and discontent with the European Union. While Stiglitz’s argument ignores large 
swathes of economic data showing that in fact economic inequality in 2016 was the lowest it 
had been since 1989.58 Stiglitz is in essence, one of the critics of the modern economic 
system, a system which France adopted starting in the 1980s. Whether or not Stiglitz’s 
economic view is correct is for economists to debate, but his views are perfectly in line with 
the criticisms that many have launched at the European economic regime for decades by 
French skeptics.  
 This debate fits snugly into the French narrative. As France transitioned from a 
dirigiste economy to a more German-style ordoliberal economy, France’s economic fortunes 
have not improved much. As the French economy has transitioned to a more liberal model, 
France has not given up all its state controls, but has reduced them. Under the treaties of the 
European Union as they exist now, a return to the dirigiste policies of the past would likely 
be a violation of European competitiveness laws. This implicitly and explicitly links the old 
economic model and through it Charles de Gaulle and Gaullism to the eurosceptic right. By 
adding an economic dimension to the European Union that enforces the political status quo, 
the European Union has linked Gaullist sentiments towards the economy to Gaullist 
sentiments towards sovereignty. In a sense, this has trapped the French right-wing. Unable to 
transition fully to either a liberal economy (lest they receive strikes en masse, as we have 
seen with Hollade and in particular Macron’s attempted reforms) or to transition back to a 
dirigiste model (as this would violate European law), the French economy has instead 
developed into a new beast entirely: something which scholars such as Jonah Levy have 
christened the “Social Anesthesia” economic model, characterized by high state spending to 




economies.59 This economic model is unsustainable and French Presidents since Sarkozy 
have all attempted to complete the transition to a liberal economy, with mixed results. 
LIBERAL, THE SLUR 
Of course, when we speak of a liberal economy that implies that liberal policies are 
represented on the political spectrum. Here France proves a unique case: its mainstream 
parties, while almost doubtlessly liberal by other nations’ standards, are hesitant to summon 
that legacy. In fact, this incongruity between words and actions likely also strengthens the 
Front National.   
France has a wide range of political parties claiming to follow in many different 
traditions. However, none of the French parties openly admit to following the liberal 
ideology. Liberalism, while relatively clearly places ideologically in dry political science 
circles, enjoys (or as we will see, suffers from) a variety of meanings in national contexts. In 
the United States for example, liberal has been taken to mean leftist, in the United Kingdom 
it means centrist. However, in France the term has been most accurately accepted into the 
French psyche as signifying “heartless capitalist”.60 This is why Macron and his broadly 
speaking liberal party, LREM have not called themselves a liberal party. While the ideals of 
liberalism exist in France, they are given under different names. One anonymous LREM 
official told Politico EU that  
“In France, the word liberal is rarely used these days except as a term of abuse — as 
in the term ‘ultra-liberal,’ meaning ultra-capitalist… Macron is accused by the Yellow 
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Jackets of being an ultra-liberal president for the rich. It’s not a label we accept or want to 
encourage.”61 
Here we see a particular incongruity between broader European movements and 
French attitudes. The European Union has many openly liberal politicians and the EU as a 
whole has been focused on increasing competitiveness and other liberal policies since the 
Lisbon treaty. This incongruity between France and the European Union is quite striking. In 
fact, even “liberal” French presidents such as Macron have not been unaffected by this.  
This increased liberalization of Europe has even been criticized by Macron, who 
many describe as a liberal, directly. In 2018, Macron criticized the “ultra-liberals” of the EU 
who he said had failed the working people of Europe.62 To emphasize this point, this is a 
“liberal” president using liberal in a derogatory manner towards the European Union. Here 
we can very clearly see Macron speaking from a French context that may not match the 
rhetoric of other nations.63 
This perception of heartless capitalists running the economy in a way that does not 
benefit the people speaks directly to the rhetoric of the Front National. The sentiment that all 
parties are the same and that the “elites” will do what benefits them rather than what they say 
plays absolutely to the strengths of the Front National. The Front National’s rhetoric has 
always been one of the elites vs. the people, a trait that does not make them unique amongst 
populists, even French ones, but they are doubtlessly beneficiaries from this incongruity 








63 While Liberal demonization has absolutely occurred in other countries, such as Germany, there is not 
anywhere near as deep a loathing for the concept and word liberal, as is demonstrated by the presence of openly 
liberal parties in most other European democracies. 
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delicate balancing act of following liberal policies while also avoiding a confrontation with a 
skeptical French public. Yet as we have seen by their election results, this balancing act is not 
successful.  
Another factor in this distrust of anything labeled liberal comes from France’s unique 
political history. De Gaulle was very wary of the Anglo-American alliance and sought to use 
the European project as a way of securing French power and independence. To this day, the 
United States remains a constant topic in French politics. Leftist and Rightist candidates alike 
bemoan the influence of the United States in Europe and in France. The modern political 
order of the West is seen, rightly or wrongly, as deeply American by nature. To traditional 
Gaullists and nationalists, this poses a fundamental threat to France. This comes from 
France’s long and troubled history during the Cold War, where the nation pursued a semi-
independent foreign policy, different from the course of the United States. Within the 
European Union, this is quite an oddity and this view has left its mark on the French 
understanding of politics.  This absolutely plays a role in the Front National’s rhetoric. As we 
will see later, Marine Le Pen has intentionally drawn parallels between her party and this 
Gaullist legacy. By portraying her anti-liberal policies as an extension of De Gaulle’s 
policies, she gains legitimacy and support that does not make sense outside of a French 
context. 
THE “OLD BOYS” CLUB OF FRENCH POLITICS 
Building on this distrust of liberalism, which is seen as unfairly benefiting the few at 
the expense of the many. The apparent French love for equality is undermined by yet more 
societal structures within France. The greatest offender of this are the Grandes Écoles. These 
are elite public universities in France that exist in parallel with and offer competition to the 
standard universities of France. In France, university access is guaranteed as long as one 
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holds a Baccalaureate, however this guarantee is not extended to the Grandes Écoles. These 
are the finest institutions in France and only take a small number of carefully selected 
students. These students receive a very good education and almost all graduates go on to fill 
top civil service positions. 
 Peter Gumbel is a British journalist and expert on French education who has spent 
the last few decades criticizing French education and demanding reforms. He argues that 
while French educational policy may have a strong reputation abroad it is increasingly 
becoming social unequal and the institutions of the “old-boys’-club” have never been 
properly dismantled. To quote Gumbel, “David Cameron [British Prime Minister at the time] 
gets a hard time for surrounding himself with old Etonian buddies and being out of touch, but 
compared with François Hollande [then French President], who has surrounded himself with 
his old classmates, Cameron seems harmless. In France it's still a system of jobs-for-the-boys 
that was prevalent in Britain back in the 1950s."64 As such, administration in France can be 
characterized not as a meritocracy but as a quasi-meritocracy with rampant nepotism. While 
French public servants are doubtlessly well-educated, the lack of accountability and actual 
consequences creates a culture in which good governance is not the primary goal. In the 
words of an anonymous French civil servant who was interviewed by Gumbel “it [French 
public service] is like an elevator. You step in and move up”.65 Those civil servants who 
make mistakes or are bad, are not fired, rather they are put into low-profile jobs and avoid the 
public limelight while still doing their jobs.  
So, what we can we gather from our analysis of French institutions? Fundamentally 
France is stuck with an entrenched elite that attend the same schools for generations, who all 
 





take top government jobs regardless of party and who have broadly moved into a broad 
consensus that liberal economic policy is the only way forward for France. These factors 
come into conflict with France’s economic and political history, both of which would point 
away from the course of action taken by French elites. Economic interventionism has been a 
stable of French economics since 1945 and the idea of an entrenched elite reminds starkly of 
the aristocracy that France once so bloodily eliminated. These factors lay a convincing 
foundation for discontent with French politics, but they do not explain why Le Pen has had 
such success. We know how the French system is structured, but we do not know how the 
political class has used this structure. We have the props, but we have not seen the actors use 
them. Even the most ardent historical institutionalist would never say that institutions set us 
down a path we cannot change. So, we must also discuss how French politicians have dealt 
with the rise of populism and with economic stagnation. What have French political figures 
done to try and navigate this storm? Conversely, we must also analyze what the Front 
National has done. The Front National does not exist in stasis and is just as much a player in 
this political game as any other party. So that begs the question, what has the Front National 
demanded and how has it maneuvered itself in the last few decades of French politics? 
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CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS 
When detailing the history of the European Union, the French Referendum on the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty is often seen as the turning point in European integration: the 
moment when European integration no longer was seen as something which the population 
tacitly approved . Jacques Delors is quoted as saying that in the wake of the referendum 
result „Europe began as an elitist project in which it was believed that all that was required 
was to convince the decision-makers. That phase of benign despotism is over.” 66 
 This sentiment would prove its wisdom with the 2005 rejection of the European 
constitution in France. In which French voters rejected a European constitution with 54.67%  
voting no. This referendum had a much deeper effect on France and on the general societal 
currents in France than is generally understood by those outside of France. The referendum 
led directly to a political gap in French politics that was filled by the Front National. Through 
political unions, internal conflict and downright despotism, the French mainstream managed 
to shoot itself in the foot and in the process, create a narrative space for the Front National 
and parties like it. By creating broad political unions or Volksparteien that disregarded 
France’s political traditions, the French right-wing created the political space necessary for 
Le Pen to attempt a rebranding of her party along more Gaullist lines, an attractive prospect 
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NEO-GAULLISM: A DIVERGENCE 
 In 1992, the direction of the Gaullist tradition had not yet been cemented. This is 
evident in the opposition to the Maastricht treaty, as besides the Front National there existed 
two other opponents on the right wing: Phillippe Séguin, and Charles Pasqua, both of whom 
were members of the right-wing mainstream. While France would in the end, vote in favor of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the French support was considered weak. It was referred to as the 
“petit-oui” or small-yes. This broke with the consensus that Delors and others noticed: the 
public was growing less accepting of top-down European integration. But what matters most 
to us is the general trend that Séguin and Pasqua represent, having served as sourverainist 
checks on European integration within their own parties. While their economic policy cannot 
be said to have been dirigiste, their claim that the party had lost its way, when it came to 
Gaullism, was rather indicative of the changes in Gaullist politics. This shift would occur 
gradually, but by the 1990s and 2000s, the more strictly Gaullist Gaullism would be 
essentially extinct within the French mainstream, leaving the strict Gaullist approach open to 
be appropriated by the Front National. 
 But to better frame the traditional Gaullists and their transition out of politics, we 
must address their main rival. Jacques Chirac has been little mentioned in this work, despite 
his impact on French politics. That was not a mistake, rather it was because Jacques Chirac 
remains a difficult politician to explain. Chirac’s death in 2019 led to a seemingly 
contradictory reaction on the part of the French. His obituaries had few accomplishments and 
many failures, yet the French adored the man. It would be an understatement to say that the 
amicable and charismatic Chirac was an adept politician, but it would also not be false to 
characterize him as an turning point in right-wing French politics.  
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 Chirac is remembered as an ardent European and for cementing the new liberal 
economic policy of France. His stance on the 1992 Maastricht treaty referendum is a great 
example of his political motivations, for on the issue of Maastricht, Chirac faced revolts 
within his own party, forcing him to take a stand internally. Maastricht showed that there 
existed a split in the Gaullist party on further integration: a split between the newer more 
liberal French Gaullist tradition embodied by Chirac and the more traditionalist sovereigntist 
approach of Séguin and Pasqua. 
 It must be noted that Séguin and Pasqua were not fringe or far-right politicians. 
Rather they were members of the mainstream Gaullist right. At the time of the referendum, 
Séguin was President of the National Assembly and Pasqua was the former Minister of the 
Interior from 1986 – 1988 and would become Minister of the Interior again in 1993. These 
two men were traditional Gaullists and after Chirac’s defeat in the 1988 presidential election 
they worked together to “regenerate the RPR and to find inspiration in the message of De 
Gaulle”.67 They would fail to win the French referendum, but it was quite a close affair and 
both men would become famous public figures. 
 Their plan would come to naut however, and both would leave politics in the early 
2000s. Séguin would resign from his party in 2002 over the latter’s desire to join with the 
other right-wing parties in the proposed Chiracist Union: the UMP. Pasqua would meet a 
similar end after betting on Chirac’s protégé turned rival Édouard Balladur over Chirac. Two 
prominent traditional Gaullists, both of whom, while focusing on French sovereignty over 
economic policy, represented an older stream in Gaullism that broadly disappeared from 
mainstream French politics under Chirac and his successor Sarkozy. Despite this, Sarkozy 
had originally been seen as a return to traditional Gaullism. 
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 Sarkozy had been considered by many to be a neo-dirigiste, at least based on his 
rhetoric. While initially toeing the neo-liberal line, Sarkozy’s response to crisis would be 
typically dirigiste, although it was mixed in success. Jonah Levy, a scholar focused on French 
economics, argued that indeed, Sarkozy served as a rhetorical counter to the neo-liberalism 
supported by Chirac.68 But Levy also remarked that the “neo-dirigiste bark [had] not 
[barked]” (or at least not barked more loudly).69 Sarkozy, like Mitterrand, can best be 
understood through two separate but equal halves. For Sarkozy, this is before and after the 
2008 Eurocrisis. Sarkozy’pre-2008 policy was what many including Levy have called neo-
liberal. The Social Anesthesia model was producing high costs and low employment. This 
could not go on and Sarkozy himself stated that “Today, there are three certainties:  the 
[French social] system is not financially sustainable, it discourages employment … finally, it 
does not provide equality of opportunity”.70 As such Sarkozy’s economic policy was 
characterized by a decrease in costs and an increase in flexibility, yet all this would change 
after the 2008 financial crisis.  
 This unprecedented crisis caused a radical transformation in Sarkozy’s policies. His 
government would intervene on numerous occasions to either save or stimulate industries. 
This neo-statist or neo-dirigiste approach caused the French deficit to skyrocket to 7.5% of 
GDP in 2009.71 However, Levy notes that despite all the buzz around French interventionism, 
the actual actions were very moderate. In fact, the French intervention was relatively minor in 
some regards. This is primarily due to three factors: intellectual, fiscal and geopolitical. 
 
68 Chirac’s support for neo-liberalism is bizarre at best. According to sources, Chirac was free market oriented 
on instinct rather than due to any ideological persuasion. Economic policy was not one of Chirac’s focal policies 
and as such he did little to alter the orthodoxy that had been present in French politics up to this point. 
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Firstly, the Sarkozy government did not have a vision for the restructuring. For example, 
funds provided to the automobile industry existed solely to avoid factory closures. This is 
unlike a dirigiste approach which would condition these funds, for example, on the 
development of electric cars or on a new model of car. Dirigiste policy is directed towards 
changes, rather than maintaining the status quo. 
 Another constraint was the fiscal aspect. Sarkozy was right to argue before 2008 that 
the French social system was not sustainable. Even before the crisis, the French economy 
failed to meet EMU Stability Pact rules (3.0% of GDP deficit as the maximum). Thus, rather 
than producing a large amount of new funds, the Sarkozy government instead reallocated 
funds from other programs or arm-twisted government allied institutions into lending money. 
The government was also notable for its focus on supply rather than on demand. Sarkozy’s 
government felt that any aid to consumers would simply have benefitted German and 
Japanese exporters, due to French malaise in the export market.72 Thus, the scope of neo-
dirigiste actions was severely limited by fiscal constraints. 
 The third and final constraint was geopolitical. The market that Sarkozy directed was 
not the market of the 1950s. The protective bubble that French economic policy had relied on 
had been largely stripped away in favor of global competitiveness. In a globalized economy, 
effective state regulation of economic policy is contingent on international cooperation. State 
changes to economic policy are difficult when corporate structures are spread out across 
many nations and unfavorable market conditions will simply cause movements out of the 
affected country.  
The Sarkozy government, according to Levy, lacked a clear vision of how to deal with 
these economic constraints, and as such, any state intervention was minimal at best. But why 
 
72 Levy. The Return of the State. 22. 
 51 
does this matter? Because it made Sarkozy appear dishonest to his supporters and 
incompetent to his opponents. In short, his allies who wanted neo-liberal policies were 
angered by his overtures to dirigisme and his opponents felt he was nothing but empty 
promises. This failing trust for the mainstream right would be fanned by the flames left by 
the rhetoric employed by Sarkozy and also by his policy of ouverture. Both of which would 
feed the public discontent that the Front National would feed on to see gains. 
 Ouverture (opening) was a policy adopted by Sarkozy that emphasized openness 
towards the left wing. Sarkozy implemented this by appointing opposition party members to 
several key positions.73 Sarkozy himself argued that this was because he wanted the best 
people in each position.74 This also had the added political calculus of giving the appearance 
of ruling for all Frenchmen. While Sarkozy before 2007 had implemented several neo-liberal 
reforms, he also made attempts to take the concerns of workers into account. This strategy 
may have worked, had it not been torpedoed by the 2008 financial crisis. The Socialists were 
put into disarray and split on the issue of collaboration with Sarkozy and Sarkozy himself 
was put into a publicity crisis by his failed economic relief.  
 Sarkozy’s fall from grace was almost inevitable. No politician in any country does 
well under economic downturns, never mind one of the worst economic crises ever. But 
Sarkozy’s strategy of ouverture was especially damning to French politics. Opinion polls at 
the end of March 2010 showed Sarkozy’s approval rating at 30%, an all-time low for him, 
Sarkozy’s economic policy in particular was deeply unpopular, reaching over 70% of 
participants expressing a negative view.75 Levy remarks that Sarkozy’s economics became 
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the worst of both worlds: those on the left felt his rhetoric was hollow and full of empty 
promises and those on the right felt betrayed by his lackluster support for neo-liberal 
economics. As such, the right had “misplayed” its hand and had lost the support and trust of 
French voters. 
RIGHT-WING FUSIONS: A DECLINE IN CHOICES 
 One aspect of Chirac’s political career we have not yet touched on was his marriage 
of the French right-wing parties. Chirac’s support came not only from his own party but also 
from a number of smaller center-right parties, which varied in political affiliation from 
market liberals to Christian democrats. Chirac would unify these parties in 2002 under the 
name Union pour un movement populaire (UMP or Union for a popular movement). The key 
development here was the merging of various right-wing ideologies into one party and this 
showed. In the early years of the party it suffered catastrophic results in elections, as well as 
often public and often fierce competition between the various factions. Sarkozy would rise 
from this political turmoil and would oust his rivals and it showed in the 2004 internal 
electiosn. In November 2004, Sarkozy was elected president of the UMP with 85.09% of the 
votes, the runner-up Nicolas Dupont-Aignan would receive only 9.1% of the vote.76 Dupont-
Aignan served as the traditional Gaullist foil to Sarkozy’s new neoliberal approach and 
would eventually leave the party. 
These factors within the UMP, combined with France’s strong presidential system, 
created a large problem: namely that through centralization of power in one party and in one 
person, the options for political expression have been fragmented. The union of all right-wing 
parties outside of the Front National in the UMP (which would rename to Les Républicains 
after disastrous results in 2015) caused a union of forces under one president and, necessarily, 
 
76 France Politique. "chronologie UMP". France politique. Archived from the original on 19 June 2009.  
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one ideological policy: Sarkozysm, the ideology of Nicolas Sarkozy. A Presidential system as 
powerful as the French 5th Republic has always been centralized around a single person and 
their ideology, as such, a multi-ideological party necessarily follows the policy of its leader. 
Sarkozy would eventually lose an election and his party would continue to plummet in 
approval ratings and today they are no longer the force they once were and although still 
relevant, the French right wing has been severely crippled, leaving rhetorical and political 
space for the Front National, which the Front National would seize on. 
A CHANGING FRONT NATIONAL 
The Front National as a party has gone through large shifts in policy in the past. From 
a more liberal and anti-communist approach in its early days to a more protectionist 
approach. Similarly, to the rest of the French political spectrum, the Front National has gone 
through a political transformation. On both the economic and rhetorical fronts, the Front 
National has shifted to fill the void left by the collapsing right.  
The Front National’s origins start was as a neo-fascist party, this is indisputable. 
Originally the party was a nativist fringe party that achieved little support. This would change 
over time and the hardcore fascists were purged from the party in the 1970s and 80s.77 Jean-
Marie Le Pen founded the party and remained a prominent and often controversial figure in 
the party for many decades, leading it until being first replaced as leader and then removed 
from the party by his daughter Marine. Jean-Marie Le Pen has been convicted numerous 
times of Holocaust denial and of racism.78  
 
77 Shields 2007, p. 175. 
 
78 AP WorldNews. Le Pen convicted of inciting racial hatred for anti-Muslim remarks", Associated Press, 2 
April 2004. Retrieved 18 October 2008. 
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He often referred to Nicolas Sarkozy, whose parents were of partial or full foreign 
origin, as the “foreigner”, despite Sarkozy growing up in and being born in France.79 He has 
claimed that the election processes are illegitimate and has made claims about the “Jewish 
lobby” for decades.80 Jean-Marie Le Pen was and is a thoroughly far-right politician, Le Pen 
managed to make it to the second round of the French presidential elections, due to leftist 
infighting fracturing the left-wing vote to the extent that the popular Socialist leader Jospin 
could not advance to the second round. Jean-Marie Le Pen was soundly defeated by Jacques 
Chirac, even as the latter faced charges of corruption mid-campaign. Le Pen was faced with 
mass protests before the second round and the slogan “votez escroc, pas facho” (vote for the 
crook, not the fascist) became widespread.81 Le Pen also faced an 800,000 strong 
demonstration against him in Paris.82 It is clear that to the French of 2002, Le Pen was a 
monster who was unelectable, even if by chance, he managed to get to the second round. He 
gained only around 18% of the vote at the time, a not insignificant amount. Nonetheless he 
was soundly defeated by Chirac’s 80+% of the vote.  
The so-called pacte republicaine, had held. The idea that all democratic parties would 
unite to stop anti-republican parties from winning, which had been an unspoken rule in 
French politics for years, held strong in 2002.  
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In 2011, Jean-Marie Le Pen was replaced as leader of the Front National by his 
daughter Marine Le Pen and four years later she would kick him from the party. Unlike her 
father, Marine Le Pen adopted a charm offensive to woo French voters. In 2015 74% of the 
French felt that the Front National was a party of the extreme-right, merely two years later in 
2017, only 58% believed this was true.83 Marine Le Pen’s charm offensive was clearly shown 
results, her party was increasingly no longer viewed as the neo-fascist party it started as. This 
is directly provable with Marine’s vast increase in support compared to her father. In the 
2017 presidential election she received 33.9% of votes in the second round. This difference is 
too large to be attributed entirely to the difference in support for Macron and Chirac. While 
Macron was a relatively unknown politician unlike the well-known and charismatic Chirac, 
Macron did not have the corruption scandals clinging to him that Chirac did. As such, the rise 
of the Front National since Marine Le Pen’s takeover should not be minimized.  
Marine Le Pen’s charm offensive has taken the party rhetorically and economically in 
a direction more directly paralleling that of De Gaulle. For a party that had originally favored 
ultra-liberalism, the modern Front National’s protectionist and dirigiste agenda can come as a 
shock. Marine Le Pen has argued for protectionism and opposes the privatization of state 
industries, especially in the civil service.84 Marine Le Pen has argued for protectionism and 
for more state control, a position that while unpopular with French politicians, ins very 
popular with French voters. A 2011 poll found that 65% of French were in favor of a 
protectionist economic policy.85 Couple this with a 2017 poll that showed that 89% of the 
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French felt that politicians did not care about what they thought and you have a fertile 
breeding ground for political resentment.86 This fits perfectly with Le Pen’s argument “tous 
pourris” (they are all rotten). Le Pen has long argued that she represents “France’s forgotten 
ones” and “France’s invisible ones”. It is no coincidence that Le Pen’s campaign slogan “Au 
nom du people” (in the name of the People) carries with it this populist rhetoric. At the center 
of her populist rhetoric is a distain for all societal structures of power. The idea that business 
and politics are in bed together and that there exist no differences between mainstream parties 
is central to populist rhetoric. It is not without reason that Marine wrote that she is not “a 
friend of the CAC 40 and is fighting the social regression brought about by MEDEF and 
inflicted on the French people by the allies of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and 
the Socialist Party (PS)".87  
Thus, while Le Pen has maintained populist tendencies, she has increasingly shrouded 
the economic policy of the Front National in the veneer of traditional Gaullism. The same 
Gaullist tradition that has fallen out of favor in the mainstream French right. Yet this does not 
explain the normalization of the Front National’s policies on society and culture. This 
normalization can be blamed on the French right-wing’s attempts to poach voters back from 
the Front National via nativist rhetoric. 
This blame must fall at Sarkozy’s feet. Sarkozy’s “grand debates” on Islam, 
secularism and on French identity brought these historically Front National talking points to 
the forefront of society. While Sarkozy was clearly attempting to poach voters from the right 
wing, his failure to lure voters simply led to a situation where the Front National was seen as 




87 CAC 40 is a French stock index akin to NASDAQ or the German DAX and MEDEF is a business advocacy 
group. WebArchive. „Communique of  Marine le Pen”. Front National Website. Since deleted, now saved at 
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positions, rightly or wrongly, to be considered mainstream positions. The other half of the 
blame must however, fall elsewhere. Polls in 2011 showed that 42% of Frenchmen felt that 
Islam was a threat to the nation.88 As such, it is no surprise that Sarkozy attempted to open 
the debate on this topic. Whether or not Islam is a threat to France is not what we are here to 
discuss, but the idea that Islam is a threat has been a Front National talking point for decades 
and the rise of this topic in both acceptance and in public discourse has strengthened the 
Front National. This bringing of the Front National’s old rhetoric into the debate occurred at 
a time when the Front National was changing its image and claiming Sarkozy’s illegitimacy. 
The French right-wing has for decades claimed to be based on the ideas of Charles De 
Gaulle; however, by moving towards the liberal side, there now remain aspects of De 
Gaulle’s legacy that the right-wing mainstream has left behind. These are where the Front 
National has struck. Yet it isn’t only policies where the Front National mirrors De Gaulle, 
even their rhetoric has come to resemble the General’s. Le Pen and her party have adopted 
many formerly Gaullist phrases into their vocabulary to strengthen this tie between 
themselves and De Gaulle. Some examples are more subtle, others are less so.  
One example comes from a single speech held at Fréjus, where Le Pen exclaimed that 
“On our soil are enemies who plan to impose their values on us… French policy is being 
dictated from abroad, by Brussels, Washington, Berlin! … What makes us grow is our 
concern for France… Our concern for la France libre!”89 
This phrase: la France libre, carries immense weight in French culture, as this is the 
name used by Charles de Gaulle for his government-in-exile during the Second World War. 






National has been the name of the party since the 1980s, yet Marine Le Pen has renamed the 
party to the Rassemblement National. This name Rassemblement, meaning something akin to 
Rally, carries a large degree of weight in France as well. This is because during the Fourth 
Republic’s collapse, De Gaulle set up a new party arguing for a political revolution. This 
party was named the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French people). This is 
not the first time the word Rassemblement appeared in modern French politics either. 
Chirac’s party, before it was renamed, was also known as the Rassemblement pour la 
République. Having taken this Gaullist reference as a name shows an increasing closeness 
with the General’s legacy. Yet there are even more references that have been used to coat 
Front National rhetoric in Gaullist support. 
Another large Gaullist reference is the idea of a “Europe of Nations”. This name was 
taken by Le Pen for her European parliament grouping and is again a direct quote from De 
Gaulle.90 By using De Gaulle’s language, Le Pen has framed herself as his successor and can 
more legitimately paint the French mainstream right as the liberals, who as we have 
discussed, are viewed with disdain in French politics. 
What has been the effect of this Gaullist transformation? Besides the fact that Le 
Pen’s party is increasingly seen as a normal political party, she has also won notable political 
allies such as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Sarkozy’s rival from earlier. He would leave 
Sarkozy’s party in 2007 and would establish his own Gaullist and Souverainist party to 
pursue, what he called, the true Gaullist vision. He would run in the presidential elections of 
both 2012 and 2017, with little success. In 2012 he received only 1.79% of the votes cast, 
finishing seventh. In the second round he would not support any candidate and instead called 
 




on all Frenchmen to vote with their conscience (the second round was between Sarkozy and 
Hollande).91 This would change in the 2017 presidential election where he received a better 
4.70%. But more importantly, this time however, he would openly support Marine Le Pen 
and even offered to help her campaign.92 Many have called Dupont-Aignan a collaborator 
and he has faced many resignations in his party over his decision, yet the idea that a 
staunchly traditional Gaullist, formerly of the center-right, would choose to ally with Le Pen 
over Macron is powerful and indicative of the normalization and rhetorical shift the Front 
National has accomplished. If traditional Gaullists skeptical of the European Union and of 
France’s current elite have accepted her as the successor of De Gaulle and  Le Pen herself has 
argued that she has a “great proximity” to De Gaulle’s politics, saying that she and De Gaulle 
had the same vision for France: “A free, independent and sovereign France”93, then can she 
legitimately be viewed as an ideological successor to De Gaulle? Perhaps. 
In conclusion, we have seen the French right-wing consolidate and move away from 
some of its Gaullist traditions while at the same time we have seen Marine Le Pen move into 
the same ideological space. Through rhetorical shifts and policy changes, the Front National 
has positioned itself as a Gaullist successor to rival the mainstream right and this has shown 
success, especially when the right-wing parties of the mainstream are in disarray, as has been 
the case since, debatably, Sarkozy’s departure. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 Throughout this article we have discussed many factors and delved deep into French 
history and cultural developments to try and understand where French populism comes from. 
We have found many problems in French society that all play right into the rhetoric of 
populists.  
 France’s weak economy and incomplete transition to a liberal economic model has 
left the state with high spending and a large debt burden. The economy struggles to employ 
all of France’s population and the French lower classes have, much like in the rest of Europe, 
seen little economic growth since the 2008 crisis. French politicians have, in response to this, 
attempted to reform the economy in a system where change is painful and slow, and 
politician’s only answer to the pain has been to back down or to increase spending. French 
politicians are, for better or worse, chained to the liberal economic policy of the European 
Union and as such, have little choice but to attempt the transition into a liberal economy.  
 For a nation where liberal is a slur and where such policies are viewed as cruel and 
heartless, any frank discussion about the French economy will quickly become heated. The 
French distrust for authority and willingness to show their contempt for the state via protests 
has led policymakers to fear the public’s response to change. This paradox remains the key 
challenge for French politicians: how to convince a skeptical population to accept the 
economic reforms necessary to make France prosperous within the current European system. 
We have seen a variety of approaches from French policymakers, Presidents such as 
Hollande have sacrificed themselves on the altar of public opinion to attempt the reforms 
they view as necessary, sometimes wrongly. Yet what has remained is an economy in 
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transition, a system in need of many changes and unable to make any changes without pain. 
Mainstream politicians, both left- and right- wing have attempted to reform the system in the 
only way the current political order can, driving claims that both parties are the same. The 
radical left and right have both used this as a framing device for them vs. the elites.  
 Alongside the Europe-wide changes to political party structure, French politicians in 
particular have abandoned their representative role and act more as governing parties. They 
have acted not as conduits through which the French public expresses its will, but rather as a 
technocratic system that occasionally faces trials by public opinion. This is further 
entrenched by the elitist nature of French public service, where politicians come from a 
completely different social caste than the average voter. Politicians such as Hollande who 
have attempted to portray themselves as “one of the people” have not been successful. The 
prevalence of the grandes écoles and their graduates and social circles in French politics 
further enhances the claim that there are only two groups: the people and the elite. 
In this mess, we have the Front National, revitalized after a leadership swap, ready to tackle 
the mainstream. Marine Le Pen, unlike her father with his fascist dog-whistling, has wrapped 
the Front National in a veneer of Gallic tradition. By drawing parallels between her party and 
the Souverainist and Gaullist traditions abandoned by the French mainstream in favor of 
European ideals, Le Pen has given her movement an air of legitimacy and political weight 
that it perhaps does not deserve.  
 By tapping into the French traditional order that has been abandoned since the 1980s, 
Le Pen offers a return to wholly “French” politics. By invoking the spirit of the departed De 
Gaulle, Le Pen offers France a strong, independent and wholly French state. She has, through 
her rhetoric, rejected the current order and lambasted the elites as out-of-touch technocrats 
serving only the rich.  
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Together with admittedly brilliant political maneuvering by Le Pen, the French 
mainstream has managed to shoot itself in the foot. By coupling economic policy with 
European integration, the French mainstream has failed to see a European Union shaped in its 
image and as such the European Union has entered an economic dimension that is in 
mismatch with the French understanding of governance. Those who oppose the economic 
order, particularly in France, have little choice but to call for reform or abolition. Even 
Macron has called for widespread reforms to the European system yet has met little success. 
The liberal economic and political order in Europe does not suit French tastes and this is why 
we have seen both left- and right-wing parties express skepticism towards the European 
Union. Both the left- and right-wing populists are gaining in France and it is clear that the 
status quo is not acceptable to wide sections of French society.  
Regardless of what the ideal economic model of the European Union should be, it is 
essentially undisputable that the French economy and society is fundamentally of a different 
character to that of the Germans and that there exist large segments of French society 
unwilling or unable to accept these changes. The neo-liberal world order is viewed with 
skepticism in France and the under-the-table tactics of French politicians to integrate the 
country with this order has allowed public discontent with the direction of the country to 
ferment.  
Into this cauldron of volatile and unique elements, it is thus little wonder that the 
Front National has been successful and continues to see gains. France’s political history is 
different from that of the Benelux countries and while France has doubtlessly benefited from 
the European system, the unique circumstances within France create a perfect storm of sorts 
that benefits populists of all creeds. The maneuvering of populism on the right to represent 
the older Gaullist legacy has placed them front and center in French politics, as they represent 
a style of governance both alien and deeply familiar to the French voter. Whether the Front 
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National will be able to maintain this central position in the French debate and how the 
mainstream French politicians will react to an increasingly strong Front National is not yet 
perceptible, but what is absolutely clear is that France’s problems with populism are no brief 
flash in the pan. France remains locked in crisis and the Front National is unlikely to go away 
any time soon, regardless of how much their opponents wish they would. 
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